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PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal**
SEPARATION FROM BED AND BOARD
Reconciliation
Unnecessarily broad statements in judicial opinions prove
troublesome for those who must contend with them later. This
is true even in jurisdictions of unwritten law, for there the
necessary must be separated from the unnecessary in order to
find the ratio decidendi, which alone becomes part of the judge-
made law. They are especially disturbing in Louisiana, however,
for here the tendency to find the law in the judicial gloss rather
than in the authoritative legislation has been encouraged by the
seeming reluctance of lower court judges to question the accuracy
of previous opinions of higher court judges, and by the impres-
sion that appellate judges are reluctant to re-examine their own
pronouncements in prior decisions. Thus it is particularly dis-
turbing to read an opinion like that in Stewart v. Stewart.' The
facts were as follows. The last of a series of acts considered
cruelty occurred on Sunday. The petitioner testified she then and
there decided to sue for separation, but could not make arrange-
ments to leave her husband's home until Tuesday, and slept
*The Symposium covers work in the appellate courts from July 1, 1965. to
**Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
June 30, 1963, as published in the advance sheets of the Southern Reporter.
1. 175 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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with him on Monday night. Without discussing further the cir-
cumstances of this one act of intercourse the court of appeal
declared that even one "voluntary" act of intercourse after cause
for separation from bed and board had arisen "could serve no
purpose other than to condone the prior acts of cruelty" on the
part of the other spouse. This language is much too strong. In
a particular instance, in the light of particular surrounding cir-
cumstances, especially if the parties had already separated in
fact, a single act of intercourse might indeed evidence that the
wronged spouse and the spouse at fault had become reconciled.
But a single act of intercourse, or even repeated acts especially
but not necessarily only where a separation in fact had not al-
ready occurred, do not necessarily indicate a reconciliation. It
or they may indicate no more than an effort to bring about a
reconciliation, an effort to prepare the mood in which a decision
might be reached to resume the common life on a permanent
basis. To hold otherwise might indeed encourage attorneys with
clients who believe they have cause for separation or divorce
to advise them to refrain from the very situations which might
prepare the way for reconciliations, and thus increase the possi-
bility of permanent estrangements.
In this connection it may be fitting to observe that histori-
cally our law must not have thought of intercourse as consti-
tuting reconciliation in and of itself. Canon law, through the
Spanish law once in force in Louisiana, forms the background
of our law on marriage; and even today under Canon law neither
spouse may, except for adultery or unless there is danger in
delay, deny the other matrimonial rights until a separation has
been declared by proper authority.2 Article 147 of the Civil
2. CODEX JURIS CANONICI (as translated in BOUSCAREN, ELLIS, AND KORTH,
CANON LAW, 4th rev. ed. 1963) canons 1129, § 1, and 1131, § 1 [hereinafter cited
as 0.J.C.) :
"Canon 1129. § 1. Either party to the marriage, by reason of adultery on the
part of the other, has the right, though the marriage bond remains intact, to
terminate the community of life even permanently, unless he consented to the
crime, or was the cause of it, or condoned it expressly or tacitly, or himself
committed the same crime."
"Canon 1131. § 1. If one of the parties has joined a non-Catholic sect; or
educated the children as non-Catholics; or is living a criminal and ignominious
life; or is causing grave spiritual or corporal danger to -the other; or makes
the common life too hard by cruelty -these and other things of the kind are
so many lawful reasons for the other party to depart, on the authority of the
Ordinary of the place, and even on his own authority if the grievances are
certain and there is danger in delay."
It is to be noted too that whereas voluntary intercourse with certain knowledge
of the fact constitutes condonation of an act of adultery under canon law (C.J.C.
1129, 1 2), it cannot of itself constitute condonation of other causes for separa-
[Vol. XXVII
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Code, now repealed by Act 65 of 1928, contemplated an award
of alimony to the wife pendente lite only if she "has left or
declared her intention to leave the dwelling of her husband."
In all probability, therefore, our legislation as distinguished
from our jurisprudence contemplated that the spouses might live
together as man and wife until the judgment of separation from
bed and board.
Proof of Abandonment
In 1958 article 145 of the Civil Code was amended to change
the mode of proving abandonment from necessary issue of sum-
mons to return and failure to do so to proof "as any other fact
in a civil suit." Article 143 of the Civil Code, both as it stood
before and as amended in 1958, states "abandonment . . . can
be admitted only ... when he or she has withdrawn himself or
herself from the common dwelling, without a lawful cause, has
constantly refused to return to live with the other, and when
such refusal is made to appear in the manner hereafter directed."
(Emphasis added.) Very clearly proof the defendant has left
the common dwelling without lawful cause will not of itself
suffice to prove abandonment. There must be proof of a constant
refusal to return, though this proof may be made "as any other
fact" and no longer need depend on a failure to obey a summons
to return. Sciortino v. Sciortino3 very correctly decided in this
fashion.
"Voluntarily Living Separate and Apart for One Year"
Article 138 of the Civil Code was amended in 1956 to add
voluntarily living separate and apart for one year without recon-
ciliation as a cause for separation from bed and board. In the
same Sciortino case discussed above, 4 husband and wife sep-
arated pursuant to mutual agreement and with a view toward
separation from bed and board. The husband returned, however,
and thereupon the wife left. Her contention was that the hus-
band's return did not end the voluntary living separate and
apart, for she had not become reconciled to him and the separa-.
tion remained voluntary as to her. Judge Barnette distinguished
"living separate and apart" under R.S. 9:301, the two-year di-
tion if the parties have not yet separated in fact, for they have no right to refuse
each other cohabitation until a separation is authorized (See C.J.C. 1131, § 1,
above quoted).
3. 188 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
4. Ibid.
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vorce law, from "voluntarily living separate and apart" suf-
ficient for separation from bed and board under article 138 of
the Civil Code, and held that whereas the former need be volun-
tary only on the part of one spouse, the second must continue
mutually voluntary for the whole period. In this opinion Judge
Barnette followed the construction placed on article 138 by the
writer in 1956.1
ALIMONY
Alimony Pending Suit
Article 148 of the Civil Code allows alimony pending suit (1)
if the wife has insufficient income for her maintenance, which
alimony must be "proportioned to her needs and the means of
her husband." "Means" certainly refers to total actual economic
resources and not simply to income as such; but it may be asked
whether it may be taken to refer to potential as well as actual
resources. Yet in Viser v. ViserO the Court of Appeal for the
Second Circuit based its award more on the husband's earning
potential than on his income or means, for although the husband
was conceded to have neither income nor assets with which to
pay, the court awarded alimony because "the record does reveal,
however, that he possesses the capacity to earn perhaps sub-
stantial income." The jurisprudence has gone so far as to say
a husband may not deliberately reduce his means with the motive
of avoiding liability for alimony;7 and if this was the actual
situation in Viser, then the decision has at least the basis of
prior constructions of the alimony laws. From the opinion, how-
ever, it cannot be said that the husband in fact had sufficient
present economic resources to pay.
Alimony After Separation
Another related decision was rendered by the same court of
appeal that rendered Viser. In Smith v. Smith" alimony after
. separation, rather than alimony pending suit, was involved. The
court admitted the husband's present inability to pay the amount
awarded by the lower court, but observed "the record reflects
5. Pascal, in Legislation Affecting the Civil Code and Related Subjects, 17
LA. L. REV. 22, 23 (1956).
6. 179 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
7. See, for example, Zaccaria v. Beoubay, 213 La. 782, 35 So. 2d 659 (1948).
8. 185 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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the husband is able to work and that he owns ... a considerable
amount of property" and affirmed the award. This decision is
much more defensible than Viser in that the husband had assets
or "means" within the meaning of article 148 of the Civil Code,
which article judicial opinion has applied as the norm for ali-
mony after separation from bed and board as well as pending
suit. What may be questioned is whether the long-standing prac-
tice of applying article 148 of the Civil Code, rather than article
160, in determining alimony after separation from bed and board
is the most equitable way of filling the lacuna left by the absence
of a particular legislative text on alimony after separation. The
writer believes article 160, on alimony after divorce, would be
the better to apply by analogy to this situation. Article 136 of
the Civil Code states, separation "puts an end... to the common
concerns" which existed between the parties, just as does di-
vorce, and the liability thereafter should not exceed that after
divorce.
Alimony After Divorce
Lloveras v. Reichert,9 decided in 1941, held that after divorce
based on living separate and apart for two years the wife who
would claim alimony must show she has not been at fault, and
that she may not consider as conclusive of absence of fault on
her part a prior judgment of separation from bed and board in
her favor based on a cause in the nature of fault on the part of
her husband. Barr v. Freeman0 presented the same situation
and followed Lloveras. This subject must be discussed in some
detail.
Before 1898, article 160 of the Civil Code allowed alimony
only to the wife "who has obtained the divorce." At this time,
however, the wife coud not have obtained a divorce unless she
either (1) proved her husband's adultery or sentence to an in-
famous punishment or (2) showed she had obtained a separa-
tion from bed and board from him and had not become reconciled
to him after a year. Recalling that all causes for separation at
this time were in the nature of fault on the part of the other
spouse" and that a plaintiff spouse might succeed in a separa-
tion or divorce suit even if he or she were somewhat at fault
9. 197 La. 49, 200 So. 817 (1941).
10. 175 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 138, 139.
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as long as his or her fault were not such as to call into play the
exception of substantial mutuality of fault, 2 it may be said that
the "wife who has obtained the divorce" within the meaning of
article 160 was one who in the separation or divorce proceeding
had not been proved substantially at fault.
Divorce law structure changed radically in 1898. Act 25 of
that year, now represented by R.S. 9:302, allowed the spouse
cast in the separation judgment to claim a divorce without proof
of more than non-reconciliation in a certain period following the
separation judgment. To permit the wife who had obtained the
separation to claim alimony even though her husband obtained
the divorce under the new legislation, a provision thereof per-
mitted the wife in such an instance to claim alimony "as if she
had obtained the divorce." No express provision was made to
deny the wife alimony if the husband had obtained the separa-
tion and later she obtained the divorce for non-reconciliation,
but there is nothing in the reported decisions to indicate she was
ever allowed alimony in this instance. Thus even after 1898 the
separation suit decided the wife's right to alimony after a di-
vorce granted to either spouse on the basis of legislation now
represented by R.S. 9:302.
With the advent of divorce on the basis of living separate
and apart without reference to fault, now provided for in R.S.
9:301, the jurisprudence began to award or deny the wife ali-
mony on the basis of her or the husband's "obtaining" the di-
vorce without inquiring into the wife's fault or absence of fault. 3
Act 27 of 1934 (2 E.S.) corrected this in part by amending
article 160 to provide that where the husband obtained the di-
vorce on the basis of living separate and apart the wife could de-
mand the alimony by showing she was not at fault; but the juris-
prudence continued to give alimony to the wife who obtained the
divorce, regardless of her fault, until the Supreme Court indi-
cated it recognized this practice to be in conflict with the actual
meaning of article 160 as opposed to its words 4 and one court
12..The exception of mutuality of fault is not provided for by any legislative
text. For representative decisions applying the exception, see 1 PASCAL, READINGS
IN LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW 124-27 (1962).- The French, also without a legisla-
tive text on mutual fault, do not admit of the exception. See PLOSCOWE AND
FREED. FAMILY LAW 227-28 (1963).
13. See, for example, North v. North, 164 La. 293, 113 So. 852 (1927) in
which the wife was denied alimony simply because the husband had "obtained"
the divorce.
14. McKnight v. Irving, 228 La. 1088, 85 So. 2d 1 (1956).
[Vol. XXVII
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of appeal applied the true meaning of article 160 in a well-rea-
soned judgment.'5 Shortly thereafter article 160 itself was
amended to say what it had always been meant to say, that after
divorce the "wife not at fault" would be entitled to alimony after
divorce.
The "wife not at fault' within the meaning of article 160 as
it now appears, therefore, should be construed in the light of
this history. So construing these words, the conclusion must be
that the wife cast in a judgment of divorce or separation based
on a cause implying her fault is certainly "at fault" within the
meaning of article 160.10 Thus if the wife is cast in a separation
judgment on such a cause, it should not matter that the divorce
has been obtained on the basis of non-reconciliation (R.S. 9:302)
or living separate and apart (R.S. 9:301). She is doubtlessly
"at fault" within the meaning of article 160 of the Civil Code.
If, however, it is the wife who obtains the separation for a
cause in the nature of fault on the part of the husband, and later
a divorce is rendered on the basis of either non-reconciliation
(R.S. 9:302) or living separate and apart (R.S. 9:301), is she
to be deemed "not at fault" within the meaning of article 160
even if thereafter she becomes guilty of action which amounts
to a cause for separation or divorce in the nature of fault? She
may, for example, be guilty of adultery, or of such defamation
of her husband as ordinarily would have entitled him to a sep-
aration from bed and board. Should it not be possible for the
husband to show such fault if the divorce is obtained on the basis
of R.S. 9:301 or R.S. 9:302? Admittedly the very language of
R.S. 9:302, that the wife obtaining the separation shall be en-
titled to alimony after the husband obtains a divorce under that
legislation, would indicate that the post-separation fault of the
wife is not to be considered in such a case. For two reasons,
nevertheless, such an application of R.S. 9:302 would not be cor-
rect. First, the alimony provision of R.S. 9:302 should be con-
sidered repealed to the extent it is inconsistent with article 160
15. Sachse v. Sachse, 150 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 138, as amended in 1956, provides for separation
from bed and board after "husband and wife have voluntarily lived separate
and apart for one year." Is the wife at fault if she agrees with the husband to
live separately and apart with a view toward obtaining a separation from bed
and board? It is possible to argue that neither husband nor wife is at fault in
that case, but it is equally possible to say both are at fault, for neither is attempt-
ing to maintain the common life. The writer is inclined to favor the second solu-
tion, but does not express a firm opinion here.
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of the Civil Code as amended in 1964. Secondly, even if not con-
sidered repealed by article 160 as amended, R.S. 9:302 should
not be applied mechanically without regard for its history and
spirit.
That article 160 as amended does exclude an award of ali-
mony to the wife obtaining the separation if post-separation
fault on her part can be shown even if the divorce action is based
on 9:302 is evident from the wording of the article. The text
indicates that the wife not at fault is entitled to alimony (1) if
she has obtained the divorce or (2) if her husband obtained the
divorce either on the basis of living separate and apart (R.S.
9:301) or non-reconciliation (R.S. 9:302). Thus article 160 as
amended treats equally and without distinction the wife divorced
by the husband under R.S. 9:301 or under R.S. 9:302, and in
either case she is entitled to alimony only if she is not at fault.
Nothing in article 160 as now amended indicates that the wife
obtaining a prior separation from bed and board need not prove
freedom from fault or may not be shown to have been at fault.
Article 160, as amended, therefore, is inconsistent with R.S.
9:302 so far as it speaks of the wife's entitlement to alimony
and must be considered to repeal it to that extent.
Even if article 160 as amended were not deemed to repeal
R.S. 9:302 in the manner mentioned, the latter could not be
applied mechanically without violating its history and spirit in
certain kinds of circumstances. Thus the language of R.S. 9:302
does not prevent the husband against whom the wife has ob-
tained a separation from obtaining a divorce from her for post-
separation adultery and thereby making it impossible for her to
claim alimony; on the other hand our practice would not permit
the husband whose wife had already obtained a separation from
him to sue her for a separation for post-separation fault on her
part, and under a strict application of the words of R.S. 9:302
she would be entitled to alimony after divorce. To avoid such
inequity R.S. 9:302 would have to be interpreted to mean the
wife who obtains the separation is entitled to alimony after di-
vorce unless she has been guilty of post-separation fault amount-
ing to cause for separation or divorce.
For all the above reasons, therefore, it is to be concluded that
the wife obtaining a separation against her husband for cause
in the nature of fault on his part is not entitled to alimony after
PRIVATE LAW
divorce on the basis of R.S. 9:301 or 9:302 unless she has not
been guilty of post-separation fault amounting to cause for di-
vorce or separation. It is submitted, however, that the wife who
has obtained the separation should not be required to carry the
burden of proving non-fault in the post-separation period, and
that the burden of proving fault should then rest on the husband,
whether the divorce action is based on R.S. 9:301 or R.S. 9:302.
In summary, therefore, the writer concludes that
(1) If a divorce is rendered either for non-reconciliation
(R.S. 9:302) or living separate and apart (R.S. 9:301)
after the husband has obtained a separation from bed
and board for cause in the nature of fault on the part
of the wife, the wife is conclusively "at fault" and not
entitled to alimony after divorce; but
(2) If the wife has obtained a separation for cause in the
nature of fault on the part of the husband, and there-
after a divorce is rendered on the basis of either R.S.
9:301 or 9:302, the separation judgment should be con-
sidered prima facie evidence of non-fault on the part
of the wife; but the husband should be allowed to show
post-separation fault on her part which would have been
sufficient cause for separation or divorce and thereby
show her to be at fault within the meaning of article 160
of the Civil Code and therefore not entitled to alimony
after divorce.
The technical bases of Lloveras v. Reichert17 and therefore of
Barr v. Freeman18 must, nevertheless, be considered. It was that
the fault issue as determined in the separation suit could not,
under article 2286 of the Civil Code, form the basis of the excep-
tion of res judicata in the suit for alimony after divorce. Thus in
Lloveras the court observed:
"While ... the parties are the same as those in the [separa-
tion suit], yet neither the cause of action nor the object of
the demand in the present [divorce] suit is identical with the
cause of action and the object demanded in the former [sep-
aration] suit."
Be that as it may, the issue of res judicata is not involved if
17. 197 La. 49, 200 So. 817 (1941).
18. 175 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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one approaches the subject in the manner in which it has been
discussed above. The fault or non-fault of the wife in relation
to the question of alimony after divorce is not finally settled by
the prior separation judgment, but that judgment, because it
necessarily determines the fault or non-fault of the wife at the
time of the separation, is merely to be regarded as prima facie
proof of her lack of fault as of the time of the divorce unless the
husband comes forward with evidence of post-separation fault
on her part. Fault or non-fault at the time of divorce, in other
words, is decided only at the time of the demand for alimony
after divorce.
TUTORSHIP (CUSTODY AND REPRESENTATION)
Venue Is Jurisdictional
The new Code of Civil Procedure has made venue jurisdic-
tional in a number of instances and the harshness of the rule is
being made manifest. Thus, because article 44 of the Code of
Civil Procedure renders absolutely null all tutorship proceedings
brought outside the parish of proper venue as declared in article
4031, Succession of Delesdernier 9 decided that acts of a tutor
appointed in proceedings outside the parish of venue were not
binding on the minor. Similarly, in Hammond v. Gibbs20 minors
were allowed to revendicate immovables sold pursuant to court
order in tutorship proceedings on the theory that the proceedings
had been brought in a parish other than that of proper venue,
even though the innocent purchaser could not have discovered
the difficulty from the face of the records. Clearly the rule as to
venue being jurisdictional ought to be reconsidered.
Custody Separate from Tutorship
Tutorship, under article 337 of the Civil Code, now repealed,
and under its "replacement," article 4261 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, includes two functions: custody of the minor and his
representation in all civil acts. The only legislative texts which
permit the separation of these two functions of tutorship are
very limited. First, through juvenile court action the custody
of the minor who is abandoned, neglected, or delinquent may be
taken from his tutor and placed in the care of others without
19. 184 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
20. 176 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
[Vol. XXVII
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reference to tutorship proceedings.21 Secondly, under article 4069
of the Code of Civil Procedure, tutorship may be divided between
(1) a natural person who will have custody as "tutor of the
person" of the minor and (2) a bank which will be "tutor of the
property of the minor." Even in this second instance custody
is identified with tutorship, even if only with "tutorship of the
person." Moreover, it is only apparently and not actually true
that custody may be considered independently of tutorship pro-
ceedings when the issue of custody after separation or divorce is
raised in a yet pending separation or divorce suit, for under
article 157 of the Civil Code the parent then awarded custody
is in reality appointed tutor or tutrix..2 2 Indeed this parent is
tutor or tutrix without qualifying as other tutors must, for under
article 4232 of the Code of Civil Procedure the parent who is
tutor may not be removed for failure to qualify. Only if the
parent-tutor wishes to represent the minor need he qualify as
any other tutor.23 Finally, even the use of habeas corpus pro-
ceedings to determine whether one already "awarded custody"
in judicial proceedings should retain it is improper, for habeas
corpus is used properly only to test one's right to custody,24 and
an award of custody constitutes the custodian's authority.
The above observations permit the evaluation of several deci-
sions of the year under review and the practices they represent.
Thus State ex rel. McClary v. StaCy25 is clearly in error, for there
habeas corpus proceedings were used to determine whether cus-
tody should be taken from the parent who had been awarded
custody in prior judicial proceedings. State ex rel. Lott v. Court-
ney2l- is subject to the same criticism, for there the court per-
mitted use of habeas corpus to re-evaluate a prior "award of
custody" to the respondent. This case also shows, however, that
the lower court had awarded custody to a stepmother and in a
suit contested by the natural mother outside of tutorship pro-
ceedings. Clearly this too was error, for tutorship proceedings
as such are necessary except where the award of custody, and
21. LA. R.S. 13:1569, 1570, 1580; 9:407 (1950).
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 157 (1870): ". . . The party under whose care a
child or children is placed. or to whose care a child or children has been entrusted,
shall of right become natural tutor or tutrix of said child or children to the same
extent and with the same effect as if the other party had died."
23. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 4171 (1960), must be read in connec-
tion with article 4232.
24. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3821 (1960).
25. 182 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
26. 178 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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therefore the appointment of the tutor, is incidental to a yet
pending suit for separation or divorce, as explained above. On
the other hand, Duplantis v. Bueto27 is a case in which the pro-
ceedings should have been by habeas corpus, but were not. The
mother had been awarded custody and therefore was tutrix of
the children. She had permitted the father to have custody in
fact, but then sought to have the children returned to her. She
proceeded by rule in the divorce suit, though certainly it had
long terminated. She should instead have proceeded by habeas
corpus and demanded return of the children on the basis of her
having been awarded custody, and therefore appointed tutrix, at
the termination of the divorce suit. With that the children should
have been returned to her. Then, if the husband believed there
was cause to remove her from the tutorship, he could have filed
suit to prove the fact and have himself appointed tutor. Finally,
Fayard v. Fayard28 is very questionable in that custody issues
after the award of custody to the mother were raised by rule in
the same proceedings rather than as questions incidental to tutor-
ship, as article 4034 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires.
The parent awarded custody after either separation or divorce
is, under article 157 of the Civil Code, appointed tutor or tutrix,
as shown before. Thus any question relating to the tutor's cus-
tody must thereafter be brought in tutorship proceedings and
may not be brought in the separation or divorce proceedings.
Interstate Jurisdiction
Essentially the same consideration as those discussed above
lead necessarily to the approval of the decision in Nowlin v.
McGee.29 A mother had obtained custody following divorce in
Caddo Parish, Louisiana. The mother and child then moved to
Texas, becoming domiciled there. The father sought to have
visitation rights fixed by rule filed in the divorce proceedings,
alleging "continuing jurisdiction," and the mother was given
substituted service. The court of appeal correctly decided that
under article 10(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure Louisiana
refused jurisdiction to consider any problem relating to the
custody of a child domiciled elsewhere and not physically present
in the state. The court might also have noted that the mother
was tutrix by reason of having been given custody and that
27. 186 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
28. 181 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
29. 180 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965)
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under article 4034 of the Code of Civil Procedure all proceedings
concerning the tutorship must be brought at the domicile of the
tutor after his or her appointment.
Restrictions on Tutor Removing Child From State
Increasingly Louisiana courts have assumed the authority to
forbid parents with custody, who therefore are tutors of their
children, to take the children outside the state temporarily or
permanently except in accordance with directives of the court.
Louisiana courts are not unique in this practice and the fact
that the motive for removing the children is often to deprive the
other spouse of his right to know them, as a matter of fact if
not of law, gives rise to sympathy for the judicial practice. This
sympathetic feeling is heightened, too, when it is the mother who
has been given custody even though the family unit has been
destroyed because of her fault. There is no legislation on the
subject, but neither can it be said that the existing legislation
has envisioned the problems resulting from the modern phe-
nomenon of widespread increasing disregard for the sanctity
of marriage and the family. Until the legislature acts, therefore,
the courts cannot but proceed equitably under article 21 of the
Civil Code, and in this the judges must be given wide discretion.
Fayard v. Fayard0 is an instance of a difficult situation which
both the trial and appellate judges sought to resolve in all fair-
ness to parents as well as children. Both permitted the mother
with custody to move to New York with the children even though
they recognized the father's opportunities for visiting them
would be all but negated, his circumstances of life not affording
him the means to provide for such visits. Certainly we in the
ivory tower cannot pass judgments on facts such as those in-
volved here.
EMANCIPATION
Compomise by Emancipated Minor
In re Greer31 raised the question whether an emancipated
minor, a widow aged thirteen years, 32 might compromise a claim
30. 181 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
31. 184 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
32. Care must be taken to distinguish the emancipated minor from the person
who is a major though under twenty-one years of age. Emancipated minors are
(1) all minors emancipated for administration either by (a) authentic act or
(b) judicial decree to that effect and (2) married persons under eighteen. See
1967]
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for wrongful death. The court decided she could by reasoning
that a minor emancipated by marriage or otherwise may cer-
tainly compromise a claim for money if he or she may alienate
his or her movables. The writer submits that a compromise is
not an alienation, or transfer for value in return, but a disposi-
tion, or transfer not necessarily for value. Nevertheless, the de-
cision is correct, for under the Civil Code the emancipated minor
not only may alienate his movables, but may also dispose of them
otherwise than by way of donation inter vivos.3 3
PROPERTY
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WATER BOTTOMS
An interesting discussion of the difference in the application
of California Co. v. Price' and Miami Corp. v. State2 appears
in the new case of State v. Scott.3 It involved the ownership of
a submerged area of land which was within the description of
an 1883 patent, and which is now part of the bed of the Gulf
of Mexico. As stated by the court: "If the land described in the
patent was under water at the time of the issuance of patent
then this case would come under the Price case, supra. However,
if it were marsh land subject to overflow as set out in the patent
and survey then it would come under the case of Miami Corpora-
tion v. State, supra.' '4 The majority of the court adopted the
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 365(1,2), 366, 367, and 379 construed in light of 382.
Persons who are majors although under twenty-one are (1) those over eighteen
relieved of "the time prescribed by law for attaining the age of majority" and
(2) married persons over eighteen. See id. arts. 382, 385 as interpreted in
light of the title to section 4 of the chapter on emancipation. A late decision not
otherwise mentioned in this Symposium, Speziale v. Kohnke, 194 So. 2d 485 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1967), made the error of confusing the major under article 385 with
an emancipated minor.
33. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 373 forbids the emancipated minor to "alienate,
affect, or mortgage his immovables" except by following certain procedures, and
article 374 forbids him "to dispose by donation inter vivos" except in one instance.
Thus the inference must be that the emancipated minor may "alienate, affect, or
mortgage" his movables absolutely (subject, of course, to the remedy for simple
lesion) and "dispose" of them otherwise than by donation inter vivos.
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1. 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954).
2. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
3. 185 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 485, 187
So. 2d 450, 451 (1966).
4. 185 So. 2d at 882.
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